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1Credit Constraints and Distance, What Room for 




Although a relative consensus is emerging about the economic effec s of credit 
development, many controversies remain as to the role of the central bank in that 
development. This pape  addresses the process of credit allocation by the central
bank as observed on a spatial basis. It examines how and why improved 
geographical access to the central bank contributes to  redit development by looking 
at the F ench experience in the ‘classical period’ (1880-1913).  n an environment of 
emerging, but highly prudent, d posit banks and the absence of a centralised money 
market, Banque de F ance branches had enough supply and demand to generate a 
network. Access to “central loans” hence r duced liquidity constraints and 
encouraged local banks and firms to lend. We shape the proof in two stages. First, a 
simple banking mod l presents our intuition and the mechanisms at work. Second, 
we take a new data set on the development of credit by French geographic area
(départemen ) to test our hyp thesis using panel econometric tools. The results 













                                                
 
 
Central banking is not the job of a single man deciding merely to 
change interest rates or the quantity of money in a given period of the 
economic cycle. It is also a microeconomic position used to gather 
information from local areas and local banking institutions. Central banks 
therefore often have a complex network of local branches all working on 
improving their knowledge of local businesses. Basically, understanding 
how businesses tick helps central banks bring funds to local players and 
relax credit constraints. Yet such a network is not always necessary and its 
optimal size may differ, depending on the central bank’s objective and the 
organisation of the money market. The French case is particularly 
interesting from this point of view, since the Banque de France played an 
important role in national money market integration and developed a large 
network of branches in the late 19th century. 
The Banque de France branches (Banque branches) were major 
French banking system players at the beginning of the twentieth century. 
By 1911, more than 180 branches2 discounted or rediscounted almost 40% of 
all bills created in France. Size, however, was not necessarily a good thing. 
For example, Bank of England branches were not without their critics (see 
Clapham, 1944). Some feared that the Bank of England branches’ use of 
their privileges might crowd out other banking institutions, reducing 
banking competition and restricting credit, especially to non-strategic 
sectors. Aversion to government intervention, the adoption of the ‘currency 
 









































1principle’ and fears of competitive distortions were thus the main arguments 
against the establishment of Bank of England branches. In addition, 
detractors argued that too many branches could be counterproductive for 
the Bank. For instance, the Bank of England used the gold in its vault to 
grant liquidity through the English banking system’s pyramid structure and 
open market operations. So the Bank provided money through the discount 
houses, which redistributed it nationwide. The organised and structured 
money market hence did away with the need for expensive branches and 
large stocks of gold.  
The French monetary system was prevented from importing the 
English system’s characteristics due to a young, non-hierarchical banking 
structure outside the largest cities (Levy-Leboyer, 1979). A central banking 
network was thus a logical alternative, as shown in a recent paper on the 
Japanese experience (Mitchener & Ohnuki, 2009). Furthermore, local 
branches could solve some information issues and generate positive 
externalities. The Banque could, for example, provide liquidity to the 
economy either directly or through the intermediation of local banks. In 
other words, the use of local information meant that the Banque branches 
could improve credit conditions in many small business areas where there 
were complaints about a lack of liquidity. In this respect, Banque branches 
rarely overlapped with local banking businesses. 
The Banque de France branches were consequently a crucial element 
of French economic policy. In addition to filling the gap historically filled by 
the market in the English case, the Banque branches were used to 
promoting credit development nationwide. The question then is whether 
positive effects outweigh negative ones. 
We answer this question using a new data set on credit supply by 
French geographic area (département). To this end, we have collected 
information on bills issued in 1881, 1891 and 1911 by taking the amount of 
stamp duty reported in the Bulletin de Statistique et de Legislation 
Comparée and evaluated by G. Rouleau (1914). As this duty was on all kinds 
of bills (“effets de commerce”), proportional to their face value, it is the 
perfect way to evaluate the amount of credit.  
Our evaluation is made up of three main steps. We first build a basic 
model explaining how the Banque branches could reduce credit constraints. 
Second, we ask whether the Banque branches increased credit development. 
Third, since the Banque is a private institution, some of its choices were 
motivated by profit maximisation. Identification issues therefore prevent 
our variable from being totally exogenous. We thus use instrumental 
variable estimations to eliminate the bias. Given the strong political 
pressure brought to bear on the Banque, the relative size of the largest cities 
is a good instrumentation method. Consequently, the IVs used are the share 
of population in the département’s number one and number two cities. 









































1use the difference between both ratios to dissipate any doubt as to the 
expected effect of development on city size. 
Basically, all results converge to establish the positive effect of the 
Banque network. Yet what mechanisms are at work? Let’s assume trade 
credit (the most common in this period). The information gap means that 
the Banque branches refuse to rediscount distant banks’ bills. These banks 
have to put reserves in their vaults to avoid liquidity constraints. Their 
credit to the economy is thus reduced proportionally by the amount of these 
reserves. Assume a new Banque branch is set up now. This new Banque 
branch rediscounts new bills from previously excluded banks. These banks’ 
supply increases automatically by the amount of their previous reserves. 
Since the merchants are thereafter sure to avoid liquidity constraints, they 
are encouraged to draft new commercial bills. In other words, the amount of 
credit to the economy grows proportionate to the banks’ previous reserves. 
Looking at robustness, the regional panel rules out some institutional 
bias. Since the legal institutions (i.e. bankruptcy law) are roughly the same 
in every French département, the econometric specifications are not 
undermined  by a lack of basic institutional variables. This point is a 
common shortcoming in cross-country models.   
Furthermore, although we focus on the French case, this issue has 
wider reaching significance. For instance, a number of developing economies 
have similar structures today. The results could thus be extended to 
financially decentralised economies where the local banks are important 
players. 
Since the local banks had more of a capacity to finance investment 
than the deposit banks (see Nishimura, 1995, and Lescure, 2009), the 
protection offered by the Banque may well have prompted a better allocation 
of capital. Therefore, the French central banking policy was probably 
efficient at promoting innovation and growth (Bazot, 2010, finds evidence of 
the establishment of Banque branches having a positive impact in terms of 
the effects of local banking on innovation and GDP growth). 
The first section of the paper looks at the historical background. 
Section II discusses the theoretical analysis. Section III presents the data 
on credit development. Section IV looks at the basic econometric 
specification and results. Section V proposes robustness checks. Section VI 
discusses some points further. Section VII concludes. 
 
I.  Historical Background 
 
The French banking system at the end of the 19th century was a 
combination of three major players3: private banks, deposit banks (Crédit 
                                                 
3 Notaries and Crédit Foncier could be added into this typology, but they do not tie in with 









































1Lyonnais, Société Générale, Comptoir National d’Escompte and Credit 
Industriel et Commercial) and the Banque de France. What was their place 
in the credit process?  
Local banks were the biggest suppliers of credit through to WWI. 
Estimates from Bouvier (1979) find they held 70% of the discount market 
up to the end of the 19th century. Local banks had, however, to deal with 
growing constraints due to competition from deposit banks. This indeed 
seems to tie in with the gradual backslide in their business. As shown by 
our tests,4 if the number of deposit bank branches per capita rises by 1 
point,5 the number of local bank branches per capita decreases by 0.48 
points (see Table 7 in the appendix). Given the average variation in the 
former (=0.02), the latter decreases on average by 0.01 points. Since the 
latter posted an average of 0.06 points in 1880, 17% of local bank branches 
collapsed under the pressure of competition from deposit banks. Not 
surprisingly, the share of local bank branches in France fell from 91% in 
1880 to 66% in 1910. All in all, the number of local bank branches 
decreased 5% from 2,017 in 1881 to 1,914 in 1911. 
Local banks had such a wide range of activities that it is hard to give 
a uniform presentation of them. They might have been single branch banks 
or multi-branch banks spread over quite a small area (the French literature 
talks about regional banks). It is, however, possible to pool some common 
features. To this end, Nishimura (1995), Plessis (2001) and monographs 
(see, for instance, Moine 2001) provide us with valuable information. Local 
banks operated in specific areas delimited by specific industries or 
businesses. They often used their private knowledge to reduce information 
asymmetries. In other words, they worked with regular clients whose 
behaviour and activities they knew well. Their loans were not limited to 
basic discounts. As argued by Nishimura (1995), complex devices were used 
to provide medium-term and long-term loans. This was especially true in 
industrial areas after 1890 (i.e. Longwy, Grenoble, Nancy and Lille).  
To sum up, local banks were in a better position to be able to provide 
riskier, long-term funds due to their private knowledge of the firms in the 
business areas where they operated. In this respect, they were probably 
more similar to German banks than French deposit banks. However, this 
aspect was an obstacle to their borrowing on the money market. Local 
banks had thus to deal with a routine liquidity risk. This is the reason why 
they appealed to the Banque de France branches for assistance. Also, 
demand peaked with the threat of deposit bank competition. 
Conversely, deposit banks opted for secure activities and often 
competed with the Banque. They captured short-term deposits and were 
consequently prompted to supply “safe”, short-term, liquid credits. On the 
                                                 
4 We only used the fixed effect results found by the Hausman test. 









































1other hand, their hierarchical structure drove them to deal in common 
discount transactions. Information was thereby easily transferred from 
branches to headquarters (see Stein, 2002, for theoretical evidence). 
However, their strategy prevented them from discounting ambiguous bills 
from (risky) local areas.  
Not unconnected with its macroeconomic policy, the Banque de 
France had major microeconomic operations in the local money markets. A 
decentralised banking system through to the last quarter of the 19th 
century (see Levy Leboyer, 1979) meant that banking institutions were 
unable to spread liquidities throughout the country. The Banque de France 
had to therefore carry the money market’s imperfections6. Three goals were 
traditionally assigned the Banque: to promote the nationwide integration of 
the financial markets, to reduce interest rates and to facilitate access to 
credit. Banque branches were the perfect tool to meet these aims since the 
network set-up meant that surplus could be removed from one region to 
meet the financial needs of other regions. 
The size of the Banque’s network can be deduced from a number of 
facts. First, in return for the monopoly of note issue granted the Banque in 
1857, the government pressed it to set up a Banque branch in every French 
département. When the monopoly was renewed in 1897, the Banque had to 
set up new Banque branches in every “prefecture” along with 30 Banque 
sub-branches. So the sum of those commitments concerned 129 branches, 87 
of which appearing because of this.  
Second, as the Banque was a private institution, profit maximisation 
triggered some new branches7. This was particularly the case in the 1890s 
when the deposit banks expanded their activities. The resulting competition 
on safe bills reduced the Banque branches’ profits and drove them away 
from their usual activities. Our evaluation finds that the average area’s 
Banque branch profits decreased by 1.2% as the share of deposit bank 
branches rose by 1%. Since the variation in this share was 27% on average, 
deposit bank competition reduced the Banque branches’ profits by 34% (see 
Table 8 in the appendix). As a result, the Banque changed its strategy and 
redeployed its businesses on a more regional manner. It also chose to work 
with previously ignored local bankers whose demand of liquidity was high8. 
As evidence of this, the regressions in Table 8 show a positive correlation 
between the number of Banque branches and profits per département  given 
the Banque loans per département. 
Third, in addition to the action of politicians (MPs and ministers), 
local lobbies (especially local banks) pressured the Banque to set up new 
                                                 
6 This confirms Gershenkron’s point of view about the role of large organisations in the 
development process of backward economies.  
7 See, for instance, the Banque Branch Committee report of 10 September 1908 on the 
establishment of the Bethume sub-branch. 










































Banque branches. The case of Cherbourg is typical. The Banque branch 
committee report of 30 May 1882 speaks of “highly active approaches” by 
Cherbourg’s municipality. Furthermore, this report gives evidence of the 
personal involvement of the finance minister. Also, the electoral map meant 
that the largest city in each département stood more of a chance of getting 
the politicians’ support.  
However, why did cities ask for Banque branches? As mentioned 
above, the growing market share taken by deposit banks reduced the local 
banks’ activities. In this respect, it became harder for “unsound” firms to 
access liquidity. Consequently, many banks and firms depended on the 
Banque to rediscount. Nevertheless, the lack of information constrained the 
Banque branches to provide services to local players only. Distance was 
therefore a major element of liquidity constraint. Some examples confirm 
this point. For instance, the Banque branch committee report of 30 May 
1882 mentions the establishment of a Banque branch in Cherbourg: “The 
d i s t a n c e  f r o m  S t  L o  ( t h e  n e a r e s t  B a nque branch) and differences in the 
nature of the transactions rule out any prejudice from the latter against the 
former”.  The report adds, “St Lo’s portfolio does not have more than FF 
200,000 of Cherbourg’s paper”. Lastly, it says, “Cherbourg’s Banque branch 
allows for contact to be made with two other banks in Valognes,” (a large 
city in the département close to Cherbourg) “which did not work with the 
Banque yet”. 
The fourth size element is that the end of the bimetallist system in 
1876 put the Banque in a very comfortable situation (see Flandreau, 1996). 
Although silver coins were not in circulation anymore, the Banque could 
still legally reimburse its paper money using this metal. The Banque could 
thus push back the bullion point from which gold escapes. The Mundell 
‘trilemma’ was somehow averted, which gave monetary policy space in spite 
of the gold standard and international capital mobility. Consequently, 
international monetary events did not prevent the Banque’s expansionist 
action on the national market. Thereafter, the related formation of metal 
provisions in the late 19th century gave the Banque the opportunity to take 
a more active position in the banking system.  
All these facts led the Banque to position itself as central banker (see 
Lescure, 2003) to improve credit conditions nationwide. Empirical analyses 
give evidence of this hypothesis. First, while the Banque’s discount curve 
was in line with the economic cycle up to 1890, it tended to be 
countercyclical from 1890 through to the war (Baubeau, 2004). Second, the 
number of Banque branch transactions rose faster than GDP from 1890 to 













































Table 1: Banque transactions 
                                                                                                                                                                 In tens of thousands of Francs  
   1860            1869 1880 1890 1900 1910
Banque branches’ total  
transactions 
3,428,996            4,348,471 5,430,351 6,741,155 10,001,923 15,375,725
Banque branches’ 
discount transactions 
3,144,962            3,427,334 4,606,548 4,835,002 6,738,097 8,310,369
Banque branches’ other 
transactions 
284,034            921,137 823,803 1,906,153 3,263,826 7,065,356
Share of Banque 
branches’ other 
transactions 
0.08            0.21 0.18 0.28 0.33 0.45
GDP excluding the  
Seine area  16,103,483            20,407,698 21,036,690 22,974,975 27,526,726 28,207,722
Banque branch 
discounting to GDP  0.20            0.17 0.22 0.21 0.24 0.29
Banque branch 
transactions to GDP  0.21            0.21 0.26 0.29 0.36 0.55
                          Sources: Reports to Banque de France shareholders 








































1Graph 1: Economic share of Banque branches’ activities 
 
 
On other hand, Banque branch transactions were particularly useful 
to local bankers. Lescure (2003) reports that the rediscount portfolio was 
made up of 83% of local bank bills in 1880 and 1910. This “marriage” was 
purely the result of circumstances. With the rise of the deposit banks, while 
the Banque needed to find new businesses, local banks loudly asked for 
Banque branches. Supply and demand were there to celebrate the union. 
Finally, new central banking activities made it easier to rediscount 
accommodation papers and low-value papers (Nishimura estimated 
accommodation papers at 6.5% of the total rediscount figure). The Banque 
became more democratic, decentralised and diversified. 
However, did the Banque’s active local stance bring credit 
development about? What mechanisms were actually at work? Did general 
equilibrium effects offset the Banque’s action? A comparison of 
départements combined with a microeconomic analysis can help answer 
those questions. 
 
II.  Credit supply and the Banque branch network 
 
Recent microeconomic banking literature gives evidence of the effects 
of distance on credit constraints. For instance, Petersen & Rajan (2002) 
prove that physical distance in the United States reduces the capacity for 
lending to small, opaque firms, although this effect wanes with progress in 
information and communication. For Berger & DeYoung (2006), the cost 
and profit efficiency of multi-branch banks decreases with physical distance 
from the parent bank. Also, Alessandrini et al. (2006) find that small firms 
suffer from both cultural and physical distance on a sliding scale with the 








































1Basically, where contracts entail local knowledge, close ties help 
tackle the information asymmetry. Since distance and the quality of 
information are closely linked, better geographical access improves the 
ability to lend. From this respect, the greater the distance, the greater the 
cost of capital allocation.  
This point is especially true of our subject in this paper. Given the 
economic weight of local businesses and industrial districts, the information 
often stayed out. For instance, a lack of tools traditionally used today 
(homogeneous balance sheet (see Lemarchand, 1996) and systematic data) 
prevented outsiders from doing business.  
The French credit system was widely built on the bill device. Let’s 
present the basic case. To begin with, a producer issues a bill to a client. If 
the creditor needs liquidity, he applies to a bank to rediscount the bill. If 
the quality of the producer and/or the client is/are recognised as good 
enough by the bank, funds are lent. The bank waits the client’s repayment 
on the settlement date. If the client fails to pay, the bank goes back to the 
producer.  
The bank was able to issue other bills directly, through advance on 
account for instance. Such credits were, however, riskier since the bank 
could rely on neither producer awareness nor joint liability. The bank 
therefore needed to be sure of the quality of its client, which called for 
substantial private knowledge. 
The Banque de France used the discount process to provide liquidity 
to banks and firms alike. Banque branches rediscounted countersigned, 
good quality bills (as proved by the rating system used in all Banque 
branches). In addition, to prevent an information gap, banks and firms 
needed to be known to and close to the Banque branch. So rediscounting 
could not be done by distant Banque branches. 
Through this process, Banque branches helped to reduce local 
players’ liquidity constraints. Consequently, local players stood more of a 
chance of securing credit to protect them from liquidity constraints. They 
were thus encouraged to issue more bills, which automatically drove up the 
volume of credit. In summary, the Banque de France’s many branches 
made for greater access to liquidity, which probably increased the 
availability of credit nationwide.  
Let’s take the example of a region (here Picardie) and mark the reach 
of Banque knowledge on the map. Within the zone, Banque branches can 












































In this scenario, a small part of the region is covered by Banque 
knowledge. Therefore, local banks outside the zone are liquidity 
constrained (note that two areas are marked as knowledge quality 
deteriorates with distance).  
Imagine that a new Banque branch is set up now. A new information 
zone is drawn on the map. Logically speaking, Banque knowledge improves. 
Other banks and firms are henceforth able to rediscount their bills. Local 
players are also less constrained by the lack of liquidity, which improves 




An easy model helps explain the intuition here. Let’s take, for the 
sake of simplicity, a trade credit economy. A bank far from any Banque 
branch is denoted at t=0, where the bank is unable to rediscount any bills. 
At t=1, a new Banque branch is set up. Now the bank can rediscount its 
safe bills at interest cost î. There are two kinds of bills: safe9 and unsafe10. 
Safe bills are those that are easy to rediscount. All the others are defined as 
unsafe bills. Credit constraints are such that demand for funds is always 
greater than the bank’s capacity11. 
In a profit maximisation process, the bank chooses its efficient 
portfolios in both periods. At t=0, the bank determines an amount of 
reserves (R) to protect itself against the risk of illiquidity. R is thus a 
                                                 
9 In this case, commercial bills are a good example of safe bills. 
10 Advance on account, for instance. 









































1function of the aggregate risk of all credit. At t=1, this risk is mitigated by 
the amount of safe ‘rediscountable’ credit provided by the bank. 
Nevertheless, the bank chooses this strategy if î is small enough to secure 
higher profits than at t=0. Therefore, if demand from safe clients is high 
enough, the bank substitutes all its previous reserves. Reserves fall to zero 
(R=0). The bank consequently raises the volume of its credit by an amount 
exactly equal to R. 
These hypotheses are clearly borne out by monographs (see, for 
instance, Moine, 1999) and Banque archives12. For example, the minutes of 
the Banque branch committee meeting state, “Bankers are not less desirous 
than people. (…) Unforeseeable demand for money from their depositor 
obliges them to keep unproductive funds in their vaults. Such 
immobilisations will disappear with the ability to get immediate liquid 
assets on presentation of their [safe] bills to the Banque rediscount office.” 
As soon as the Banque branch opens, banks substitute their ‘extra’ reserves 
with ‘rediscountable’ bills. 
Eventually, a firm issues bills if a bank is able to discount them. 
Therefore, if the volume of credit increases at t=1, firms are less reluctant 
to provide trade credit to their clients. Let  ) (L ζ  be the volume of bills 
supplied by the firm and L be access to liquidity. We know that: 
 
                                                         ) (R f L = ∆                                                  (1) 
 
  If C is the amount of credit,  ) (L C Lζ ∆ = ∆ . Under (1), the amount of 
new credit generated by the new Banque branch is: 
 
                                                    0 )) ( ( > = ∆ R f C ζ                                            (2) 
 
  In other words, the amount of credit increases proportionate to R. 
Moreover, if the elasticity of C to R is greater than one, the Banque branch 
rediscount amount is lower than ∆C. This situation corresponds to the 
credit multiplication effect. In this case, the Banque branch is plays an 
extremely important role in the development of local credit. 
In this simple model, we have to collect accurate local information on 
credit to empirically gauge the effect of the Banque network. To this end, 
we have built new data on bills issued by French département.  
 
III.  Credit data 
 
We draw on Rouleau (1914) to determine the growth in issued bills 
from 1840 to 1914. This type of credit is extremely important, representing 
                                                 
12 Minutes of the Banque Branch Committee Meeting on 10 September 1908, Banque de 









































1the majority of the loans in the period13. Rouleau evaluates the amount of 
credit provided to the economy by taking the amount of stamp duty levied 
on all kinds of bills. This evaluation is judicious for two reasons. First, 
creditors paid stamp duty to validate the authenticity of the “bill”. Second, 
by law, all bills had to be stamped. Therefore, stamp duty is a good proxy of 
the amount of credit available in the economy.  
This method has the advantage of averting many biases. First, since 
stamp duty is proportional to the value of the bill, the calculation is free of 
any hypothesis. Second, Plessis (2001) and Baubeau (2004) put forward 
that Rouleau’s series fits in with GDP and Banque de France transactions. 
Hence, the amount of credit is easily deduced from the division of the stamp 
duty by its rate.   
Dividing Rouleau’s series by GDP paints a good picture of credit 
development (see Plessis, 2001). This does, however, overlook the notary 
network’s silent loans, which are all but insignificant (Hoffman, Postel-
Vinay & Rosenthal 2001). Yet notary loans are associated more with 
mortgages, which is not our topic. 
Obviously, this result does not differentiate between rural and urban 
credit. It is an indicator of neither credit constraint nor credit development. 
However, local information by French area can address this issue. Drawing 
on stamp duty data from 1881, 1890 and 191114, we use this device to find 
out the amount of credit by département. This period has the advantage of 
being free of national and international shocks. Prices and institutions are 
smooth while the political and economic environments are relatively calm.  
  As we can see on the maps (see appendix), credit development (see 
the appendix for GDP calculation15) is quite stable over time. Basically, 
urban centres (Lyons, Bordeaux and Marseille) were more developed. 
Conversely, with the exception of major wine-producing regions 
(Languedoc, Roussillon, Champagne and Charentes), rural areas suffered 
from a low level of credit development (see, for instance, Brittany, 
Auvergne and other central western areas). Lastly, industrial départements 
in the east (Lorraine, Isère, Doubs and Saône et Loire) present higher 




                                                 
13 Advances on account are included in the calculation as well since banks issued bills for 
this purpose. 
14 Rouleau actually calculated the means for 1910, 1911 and 1912. Moreover, data by 
département are not available in the Bulletin de Statistique et de Legislation Comparée 
before 1881 and after 1891. 
15 Many thanks to Miren Lafourcade, who tested the accuracy of our GDP calculation with 
the GDP that Toutain calculated for 1862 and 1896 (see Combes et al., 2008). This test 
could not be done by us as Toutain’s data is not available yet. The comparison shows that 









































1Table 2: Distribution of credit development 
 Bottom %  1881  1891  1911 
5% 0.256  0.189  0.271 
10% 0.297  0.224  0.318 
25% 0.415  0.344  0.410 
50% 0.552  0.470  0.547 
75% 0.772  0.637  0.723 
90% 1.063  0.825  0.860 
95% 1.243  1.019  1.127 
Interpretation: In 1882, credit development in the median département is 
equal to 0.552.  
 
Map 1: Variation in credit development from 1881 to 1911 
Pale yellow when >0.1; yellow between 0.1 & 0; orange between 0 & -0.1;  
red when < -0.1. Paris and its suburbs are excluded from the map 
 
Interpretation: in a given département, if credit/GDP is 0.6 in 1882 and 0.4 
in 1910, the variation in credit development is 0.4-0.6=-0.2<-0.1, hence, the 
colour is red. 
 
Also, the basic statistics point up some facts. First, standard 
deviations of credit development are 0.39 in 1881, 0.32 in 1891 and 0.30 in 
1911 while median and mean values are respectively 0.55, 0.47 and 0.55 
and 0.64, 0.54 and 0.60. These results suggest a catching up effect. This is 
also confirmed by the growth in the 10th percentile figure and the decrease 









































1northern developing départements rather than the more depressed south-
western ones16 (See Map 1). Moreover, credit development is lower across 
all the départements in 1891, irrespective of wealth and development.  
   
IV.  Empirical tests 
 
a.  Econometric specifica ion  t
 
Panel data is the strongest econometric tool for our research in its 
assessment of the effect of the Banque branch network in space and time. 
Since we are interested in the effect of geographical access to the Banque 
branches, we test the correlation between Banque branch density and 
credit development. We add some control variables and time and regional 
fixed effects to prevent missing variable bias. So the model we test is: 
 
                  t i t i
k
t i k k t i t i u u K CONTROL SUC CREDEV , , , , , . ε β α + + + + + = ∑             (3) 
 
where CREDEV is credit development, SUC is either Banque branch 
density or the number of Banque branches, CONTROL is the set of control 
variables, K is a constant, u is a dummy, ε is the error term, i is the 
département index and t the time index, and k is the control variable index. 
The  départements of “Seine” and “Seine et Oise” are excluded from our 
regressions (see discussion below).  
Credit development is captured by two ratios. The first (traditional) 
ratio is the amount of credit to GDP. This ratio depends therefore on the 
quality of our GDP data. A comparison with Toutain’s recent calculations 
(see Combes et al. 2008) for 1862 and 1896 proves the accuracy of our 
device. Nevertheless, we want to dissipate any doubt by using another 
ratio. So we test credit development by the amount of credit per firm. This 
ratio is imperfect. Indeed, a large number of firms is not a corollary of 
wealth. The first ratio tests are therefore the best, whereas the second ratio 
tests confirm the direction of the results.   
Banque branch density is merely the number of Banque branches per 
hectare for each area. This ratio easily captures average distance to the 
Banque. Note that the Banque branches include sub-branches. Banque sub-
branches depended on the nearest Banque branch, but practised the 
rediscounting of bills as well. Gonjo (2003) shows that sub-branches played 
the same role even though they were not directly controlled by a Banque de 
France inspector. 
Control variables are the number of firms per capita, average firm 
size, population density and the number of bank branches per capita. Firms 
                                                 









































1are evaluated using business tax statistics. This tax is paid by all firms in 
all lines of business save agriculture. Average firm size is defined as non-
agricultural production divided by the number of firms. 
The number of firms per capita17, population density and average 
firm size take into account the impact of market size. As summed up by 
Levine (2005), the larger the economy, the greater the financial 
development. Furthermore, as proved by Petersen and Rajan (1997) and 
Biais and Gaulier (1997), the trade credit supply increases with wealth and 
average firm size. However, firms tend to finance themselves as their size 
increases.  
There are two different reasons for using bank branches per capita. 
First, the banking population is very important in the determination of 
credit development. Second, if the Banque chose to set up branches for pure 
profit reasons, this variable would rub out the Banque branches effect.  
Départements and time fixed effects control for local trends, as 
mentioned in the presentation of the credit development data. They also 
help to take into account local institutions. All in all, they are a traditional 
way of producing robust estimates.   
The INED website (www.ined.fr) provides the population figures per 
French département. Jobert (1991) supplies the business tax statistics. The 
Bottin du Commerce et de l’Industrie is used to evaluate the number of 
bank branches.  
 
Table 3: Statistics summary  








         
credit development  0.59/0.82  0.31/0.73 0.28/0.34 0.55/0.66 0.93/1.33 
            
Banque branch density   0.37  1.02  0.14  0.19  0.44 
            
branches per capita  0.064  0.027  0.03  0.061  0.10 
            
per capita GDP  0.64  0.31  0.38  0.58  0.92 
firms per capita   0.49  1.24  3.29  4.80  6.51 
            
average firm size  6.90  3.19  4.20  6.16  10.82 
          
population density  0.69  0.43  0.42  0.59  1.08 
                 
Interpretation: on average there is 6F of credit per 10F of production or 820F per firm, 3.7 
Banque branches per 10,000 Ha, 6.4 bank branches per 10,000 inhabitants, production of 
6,400F per capita, 4.8 firms per 100 inhabitants, 7F in business tax per firm, 327 
inhabitants per Ha. “Seine” is excluded. 
                                                 
17 This variable is excluded when the dependant variable is calculated using the number of 









































1b.  Results 
 
Table 4 displays within regressions with time dummies18. Our results 
highlight two points of interest. First, though the Banque branch effect is 
positive, it is small and weak. Second, the result holds only for the first 
calculation of credit development. 
 
Table 4 
Determinant of credit development 
The dependant variable is credit/GDP in [1] and [2] and credit/firms in [3] and [4]. All the 
regressions add time and geographic fixed effects. 
   Independent 
variables  [1] [2] [3] [4] 
    
Banque branch density    0.22*      0.27   
   (0.12)    (0.20)   
          
number of Banque branches      0.04**    0.05 
     (0.18)    (0.03) 
  
population density       -0.56**     -0.57**   -0.70**   -0.70** 
   (0.25)  (0.25)  (0.34)  (0.33) 
  
firms per capita    -0.11  -0.07     
   (0.36)  (0.34)     
  
average firm size    -0.11   -0.10  0.47**  0.47** 
   (0.20)  (0.19)  (0.22)  (0.21) 
  
bank branches per capita   0.15**    0.15**  0.14*  0.14* 
   (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.08)  (0.08) 
  
constant       0.92***       0.91***      0.73***     0.72*** 
   (0.34)  (0.32)  (0.10)  (0.10) 
  
R² within 0.23  0.24  0.26  0.26 
          
N 248  248  248  248 
              
***, ** and * significant at 1%, 5% and 10%. Robust standard errors in brackets. 
Interpretation: As there is on average one Banque branch per 160,000 Ha, one Banque 
branch accounts for 0.22*0.16=0.035 of the first credit development ratio. One bank branch 
also accounts for (0.15)*(0.026)=0.004. 
 
A Banque branch accounts on average for 0.035 points of credit 
development. In the median département whose credit development 
indicators are 0.55 and 0.66, a Banque branch accounts for 6.4% of this 
                                                 
18 We only report results with fixed effects since the Hausman test proves the inconsistency 









































1value. This effect becomes 7.5% in [2], 7% in [3] and 7.5% in [4]19. The 
standard errors suggest that [2] is the most accurate coefficient.  
However, there is some risk of bias. There is evidence that the 
Banque set up new Banque branches in industrial areas where it could 
make profits. Therefore, even if we introduce control variables to eradicate 
this effect, some problems could remain.  
The Banque branch committee meeting minutes contain evidence of 
both profit seeking and public interest motives. Each branch authorisation 
entailed a detailed cost-benefit analysis by the Banque and city 
businessmen. The Banque always sought to balance both interests. 
Nevertheless, as long as the Banque was sure to make profits, it was an 
open-and-shut case. For instance, the report on the Bethume sub-branch 
said, “This city has incomparable wealth and industrial and commercial 
business.” While some branches were set up by public interest operations, 
many others were in the Banque’s own interest. Nonetheless, three points 
should be added. First, even if the Banque decided to set up branches based 
solely on profit criteria, no branches were opened without prior 
authorisation. Second, the Banque never chose to set up a new Banque 
branch alone. It had to apply to the city first and required government 
authorisation. Third, the archives only give the official story. There is thus 
no evidence of the wishes of the ‘governor’, as many decisions were made 
unofficially by powerful politicians. 
Lastly, there is the issue of omitted variables. The Banque branch 
variable can thus be correlated with unobserved effects such as phylloxera 
and industrial shocks. Phylloxera, for instance, could strongly reduce the 
estimated coefficient of our OLS regressions. In general, many elements 
could positively or negatively influence the estimated effect of the Banque 
branches on credit development. 
 
V.  Instrumental variables and robustness 
 
a.  Instrumental variables: presentation and results 
 
We have identified a basic problem with the previous OLS result: the 
Banque de France was a private institution! It set up new branches if the 
expected profits were sufficient. Expected profits could, however, be 
correlated with credit development. Also, in this respect, the sum of 
economic components entering into the Banque’s decision bears the risk of 
missing variables. We have therefore chosen to use instrumentation. 
Given the political influence exerted on the Banque, the share of the 
population of the first and second city (five years before the observation of 
                                                 










































1credit development) is a nice instrument20. This choice is motivated by two 
arguments. First, with the renewal of the monopoly of issue in 1897, the 
Banque was legally obligated to set up a Banque branch in all French 
“Prefectures”. Though the “prefecture” is often a main town, it is not 
necessarily the biggest city in the département21. The relative size of the 
second city is thus positively correlated with the number of Banque 
branches in the area. Second, the mayor of a large city in the area had 
strong political influence. So if the size of the second city is close to the size 
of the first city, lobbies should pressurise the government to set up a 
Banque branch, especially when the two cities are not too near to one 
another. On other hand, if the first city is predominant,22 there is less 
incentive to set up an additional Banque branch even though the second 
city is large23. Archives provide many examples of political pressure from 
cities. In all cases, “départemental” city influence is predominant. Indeed, 
the electoral map shows that the mayor of a locally influential city gained 
easy access to the top of the administration. 
  Evaluation of the effect of both IVs upon the number of Banque 
branches is as expected. The share of the first city has a strong negative 
effect. If this share increases by 10%, the number of Banque branches is 
reduced by one unit. At the same time, the share of the second city has a 
positive effect. If it increases by 5%, the number of Banque branches 
increases by one unit.  
Although the EI-test24 (exogeneity of instruments) and J-test of our 
regressions confirm the quality of our instrumentation, a large second city 
could be said to be a consequence of wealth (even if fixed effects and 
population density are still used). Also, the size of the first city is directly 
correlated with commercial development. We thus create another IV. We 
merely use the difference between the share of the first and the second city. 
As a result, rural areas can get a high IV figure even though the first and 
                                                 
é t
20 It is worth noting that the size of the two cities is not statistically correlated. 
21  22  départements were in this case in 1896, which corresponds to 27% of all the 
départements in our panel. To demonstrate the importance of this fact, we built a variable 
equal to 1 if the prefecture is not the biggest city in the d par ement and 0 otherwise. The 
corresponding dummy variable is significant (p=0.06) and positively linked (a=0.34) to the 
number of Banque branches in 1911. Here, control variables are those previously used plus 
per capita GDP plus the share of population of the first and the second city plus the urban 
population (R²=0.85). If we withdraw the share of population of the second city from the set 
of control variables, the effect increases (0.44) and is highly significant (p=0.01) (R²=0.84). 
This outcome suggests that both variables exert a similar effect. Full regressions are 
available on request from the author. 
22 This means that the second city’s population share is small even if it has a large 
population.  
23 The example of the département in which Lyons is situated bears out this hypothesis.   
24 We also check for Stock & Yogo statistics to confirm the instrumentation. Results prove 
that the instruments are not weak, especially in the second IV set. Results are available on 









































1second cities are small. Nonetheless, we unfortunately lose the ability to 
test the entire accuracy of the instrumentation with the J-test25. 
Again, the results point to the same conclusions. On average, if the 
difference in the share of both cities decreases by 7%, the number of 
Banque branches increases by one unit.   
Of course, IVs do not take into account cases with more than two 
Banque branches. However, in such situations, the areas should have a 
large second city anyway.  
 
Table 5: Determinants of credit development using IV-
GMM 
The dependant variable is credit/GDP in [1] and [2] and credit/firms in [3] and [4] GMM-IV 
regressions with time and geographic fixed effects. The IVs are the population share in the 
first and second city.  
Independent 
variables  [1] [2] [3] [4] 
        
Banque branch density  0.84**    0.94**   
    (0.34)  (0.37)  
        
number of Banque branches    0.13***    0.14** 
     (0.05)  (0.06) 
        
population density   -0.11***   -0.10***   -0.13***   -0.11*** 
    (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) 
        
firms per capita   -0.49   -0.31     
   (0.39)  (0.34)     
        
average firm size   -0.20   -0.17   -0.38*   -0.41** 
    (0.22) (0.19) (0.22) (0.20) 
        
bank branches per capita 0.13** 0.13**  0.10  0.11 
    (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) 
        
constant 0.37***  0.41*** 0.40*** 0.37*** 
    (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.10) 
        
N  248 248 248 248 
J-Test  0.65 0.63 0.62 0.62 
EI-Test  0.009 0.006 0.019 0.010 
WH-Test  0.027 0.028 0.069 0.087 
              
***, ** and * significant at 1%, 5% and 10%. Robust standard errors in brackets 
 
                                                 
25 The J-test is a test of over-identification. It is calculated if, and only if, the number of 









































1Table 6: determinants of credit development using IV-
GMM 
The dependant variable is credit/GDP in [1] and [2] and credit/firms in [3] and [4] GMM-IV 
regressions with time and geographic fixed effects. The IV is the difference in population 
share between the first and second city.  
Independent 
variables  [1] [2] [3] [4] 
      
Banque branch density  0.93**    0.80*   
   (0.41)    (0.48)   
          
number of Banque branches    0.14**    0.12* 
     (0.06)  (0.07) 
        
population density   -0.12**   -0.11***   -0.19**   -0.11** 
    (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) 
        
firms per capita   -0.52   -0.32     
   (0.39)  (0.34)     
        
average firm size   -0.22   -0.19   -0.39*   -0.42** 
    (0.22) (0.19) (0.22) (0.20) 
        
bank branches per capita 0.12**  0.12**  0.11  0.11 
    (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) 
        
constant 0.41***  0.37*** 0.37*** 0.35*** 
    (0.11) (0.09) (0.12) (0.10) 
        
N  248 248 248 248 
EI-test  0.014 0.008 0.023 0.011 
WH-Test 0.024  0.024  0.19  0.22 
              
***, ** and * significant at 1%, 5% and 10%. Robust standard errors in brackets. 
 
We use a GMM estimator26. In the first set of the IV estimation, we 
systematically test for instrument quality using the EI-test and the J-Test. 
In each case, the instruments are validated. We also run a Wu-Hausman 
test to assess the endogenous bias; results give evidence of its existence. 
The IV results are displayed in Table 5 and Table 6. 
A Banque branch accounts in the first set of IV regressions for 
0.13/0.14 points of credit development, which corresponds to 25%/22% of 
the median level. As there are two Banque branches per area on average, a 
département without Banque branches would see a 52%/46% reduction in 
its credit development. The EI tests prove that the instruments are not 
                                                 
26 The GMM estimator may be weak if the sample is too small. It tends indeed to reduce the 
p-value of the student test. We therefore test our model using the basic 2SLS regression. 










































1weak, whereas the J-tests show they are not endogenous. Note the signs of 
the instruments are those we expected theoretically27. 
The results are fairly similar in the second set of IV regressions. [1] 
increases by 0.10 points while [2] presents the same results as in the first 
IV set. [3] and [4] present weaker coefficients with lower confidence levels. 
The effect dwindles to 0.12 points, which corresponds to 18% of the median 
level.  
By comparison with previous OLS results, the effect is on average 
multiplied by four. Also, the coefficient determined by the IV regression 
appears to be more suitable given the Bank discount amounts involved. 
This indeed represents 21% of GDP in the average area in 1910. When 
normalised by the number of Banque branches, this figure becomes 15%. 
Therefore, the IV coefficients find that 1F discounted by a Banque branch 
generates 1.73F of credit on average while this amount is 0.41F in the basic 
OLS case. Also, unlike the OLS outcomes, the IV outcome provides evidence 
of a credit multiplication effect. 
 
b.  Robustness check 
 
We check for robustness by adding the Banque branches’ profit into 
the regressions. The results remain the same, while the additional variable 
is insignificant. Given the nature of the identification bias, these results 
provide additional evidence of the suitability of our instrumentation. We 
also add at the same time the share of the urban population to get a better 
control of commercial development. Again, the results remain the same 
while the additional variable is insignificant (regressions on request from 
the author).  
Instead of the previous IV, we use the information on the law of 1897 
and the relative size of the prefecture in each département. Since 22 
prefectures were not the biggest cities of their département in 1896, the 
number of Banque branches must be positively related (after 1897), with a 
dummy equal to 1 when the prefecture is not the biggest city of the 
département and 0 otherwise. According to the shape of the panel, the new 
IV is the multiplication of this dummy with the 1911 year dummy. Results 
are still positive even though the impact of Banque branches is weaker 
than above. The Banque branch accounts now for 12% of credit 
development. Significance is reduced as well. Estimations are significant at 
10% with the first calculation of credit development, while they are near 
but above this threshold with the second calculation (p=0.11). Also, Stock & 
Yogo tests and EI-tests prove that the instrument respects the basic 
                                                 
27 In the first IV set, the coefficient of the population share of the first city is negative while 
the coefficient of the population share of the second city is positive. In the second IV set, the 
difference between both population shares is negative. All results are available on request 









































1conditions of IV estimations, whereas the Hausman tests do not display 
endogenous bias anymore28. All in all, these estimations are logically less 
robust than those previously presented. Indeed, regarding the number of 
départements with an increase in Banque branches from 1897 to 1911, this 
IV matches with only one-third of all observations. In any case, these 
results confirm the previous ones and prove that our instrumentation 
strategy was good. The results are displayed in Table 9 in the appendix. 
Lastly, we run cross-département regressions on temporal difference. 
The estimated variable becomes the difference in credit development from 
1881 to 1911. We therefore test for the effect of the Banque branch 
variation (difference from 1881 to 1911), instrumented by the second IV in 
1881 (difference between the share of the first and second city in 1881). We 
also add, aside from the usual control variables, figures representing how 
they differ over the period (we add in, for instance, the difference in 
population density from 1881 to 1911). The effect is strongly positive and 
highly significant. One additional Banque branch entails a positive 
variation of 0.09/0.11 points of credit development. Note that the EI-tests 
and WH-tests produce the same results as above. The results are displayed 
in Table 10 in the appendix29. 
 
c.  The “Seine” and “Seine et Oise” issue 
 
An important fact has to be pointed up. All our regressions exclude 
the “Seine” and “Seine et Oise” areas30. Two reasons explain this choice. 
First, these départements are small with high populations. ‘Banque branch 
density’ is thus artificially high. Second, since the head office of the Banque 
is located in Paris, it attracts bills from others countries. This choice raises 
two questions. First, do head office particularities generate bias via the 
action of the largest companies located in Paris? For instance, did 
industrial firms in Le Creusot (Saône et Loire) discount their bills in Paris 
or in Macon? Second, did deposit banks discount their paper in Paris or at 
the nearest Banque branch?   
‘Average firm size’ helps deal with the first issue. Its positive 
correlation with credit development dissipates any doubts about the large 
company bias. Furthermore, fixed effects capture these phenomena as long 
as they are stable over time.  
Second, Lescure (2003) shows that Banque branches’ balance sheets 
were contained large volumes of deposit bank discounting. Some values are 
especially high in large cities (Lyons and Bordeaux). This fact is also 
                                                 
28 Even if endogenous bias is not proved empirically, the doubt remains theoretically.  
29 Note that we only present the coefficients for the variable of interest. The other variables 
are available on request from the author. Nonetheless, there are no surprising outcomes. 
30 Note that adding ‘Seine & Oise’ does not change the significance of results. However, the 









































1corroborated by Plessis (2001). Therefore, deposit bank branches discounted 
their bills at the nearest Banque branches.  
 
VI.  Discussion 
 
What do these outcomes suggest about economic development? We 
know that credit development grows with the Banque branch network as 
long as the relationship remains a key point of the banking system. 
Nevertheless, did it bring about economic development? Subsequent 
authors could shed light on this issue. First, the system had no overall 
consistency and did not allow for any real monetary policies. In other 
words, the Banque acted in a microeconomic way instead of a 
macroeconomic way. Second, the system relies on a costly stock of gold and 
prevents the utilisation of modern monetary tools. Third, protection of 
small banks entailed a kind of economic ‘Jacobinism’. It thus prevented the 
emergence of large ‘universal’ banks more able to promote innovation and 
growth using modern credit tools, critics say.  
Conversely, a number of arguments stress the positive effects of the 
Banque’s policy. First, Banque branches helped capital market integration 
especially in backward areas. Second, because of private information 
requests from the productive system, deposit banks could not find a 
counterpart to their short-term deposits in the modern and/or industrial 
sectors. Deposit banks thus chose to take over the safe business of trade 
credits. In response to this competition, local and regional banks took 
advantage of their private and local knowledge to move into in riskier, but 
highly productive businesses. In this respect, local and regional banks were 
closer to the German universal bank ‘ideal’ than deposit banks (see 
Lescure, 2009). Third, the Banque was flexible and often agreed to 
rediscount risky papers from industrial areas (see Nishimura, 1995). In this 
way, the Banque encouraged the use of modern credit tools basically needed 
by industry. Fourth, some market failings can appear. Although the deposit 
banks were highly profitable, their interests did not necessarily tie in with 
those of the markets driving growth. 
 
VII.  Conclusion 
 
In an environment of poor access to money and strong credit 
constraints, the Banque de France became a central hub of the French 
financial system. This contribution shows that better access to the Banque 
branches improved bill liquidity and credit development.  
The Banque relied on local bank positioning to implement its policy 
for a number of reasons. First, local banks were in the local business 
heartland. Second, these banks needed access to central liquidity. Third, 









































1its traditional activities. It was to cope with all these constraints that a 
large number of Banque branches opened after 1897. The outcome was 
considerable, as a Banque branch accounted for 26% of the credit 
development of the median geographic area. 
Local bank monographs and the Banque archives show that the 
mechanism was simple. A Banque branch rediscounted a bank’s safe bills. 
The Bank was then encouraged to increase its credit to local firms to make 
profit. In turn, firms drafted more bills that were thus easily discountable 
to the bank. All in all, we evaluate that 1F discounted by a Banque branch 
triggered 1.73F of credit.   
However, questions remain as to the effects of Banque policy on 
economic development. As mentioned above, previous studies on the topic 
(see Nishimura, 1995, and Moine, 2001) confirm the Banque’s positive 
impact on innovation and industrial investment at micro level. 
Nevertheless, by sustaining local activities, the Banque could prevent the 
appearance of large industries with a greater capacity to drive growth. The 
debate is of vital importance, but remains unsolved to date. Answers seem 
all the more imperfect as Banque policy was part of a complex and 
embedded institutional structure. In other words, the efficiency of Banque 
policy should be appraised in terms of its objectives. From this point of 
view, the present paper is quite optimistic.  
Lastly, the results open up prospects for developing economics. This 
study concerns backward economies in small business areas with 
substantial local banking structures. It consequently highlights the 
government’s responsibility in addressing credit constraints and credit 
development. Given that many countries have similar banking structures 
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Credit development in 1881, 1891 and 1911 














































1Appendix 2: GDP calculation by French département  
in 1881, 1892 and 1911 
  
 
Our estimation uses Toutain’s series on agricultural production and 
the amount of business tax31. Given that business tax is levied on all trade 
and industrial sectors, it can be a good alternative to the actual calculation 
of non-agricultural output. Since the tax was also more or less proportional 
to the wealth of the firms, it turns out to be the perfect complement.  
The proportional part of business tax was calculated on the basis of 
the rental value of all the productive inputs. If a firm had more than one 
business located in different areas, it had to pay the tax in each area 
proportional to the corresponding rental value. Rental value is, however, 
quite an opaque expression. In actual fact, the tax office determined the 
rental value of an establishment based on its expected level of production 
despite the potential existence of some intra- and inter-district disparities. 
We know, for instance, that the tax rate differed from one area to the next. 
We also know that inflation drove up rental values in some areas. We 
therefore have to assume that the combination of these effects is weak32. 
Although this single hypothesis is quite strong, a combination of small (ad 
hoc) hypotheses is often stronger at the end of the day. Moreover, it is 
unfortunately impossible to calculate historical series with complete 
accuracy. Evidence of this is found in the differences in the GDP series 
produced by Toutain and Levy-Leboyer33.  
We therefore assume a constant coefficient from the business tax on 
non-agricultural production. This helps find the coefficient (β) relating to the 
amount of tax on commercial and industrial value-added. 
For each département, GDP is: 
   
(1)                                                t i t i t i t i P A Y , , , , β + =   
 
where Y is GDP, A is the production of the agricultural sector and P is 
the amount of tax, i is the département index and t the time index. For 
France as a whole, (1) is rewritten: 
 
(1’)                                           ( ) ∑ ∑ + =
i
t i t i t i
i
t i P A Y , , , , β  
 
Since we let β β = i , we obtain: 
 
                                                 
31 French tax of “la patente”. 
32 Note that one bias can often offset another.  








































1  t t t t P A Y β + =  
 
Then we can determine the value of the coefficient: 
 





= β  
 
As we know Y, A and P for all départements, it is easy to estimate 





t i t i P
P
A Y
A Y , , ,
−
+ =  
 
Utilisation of this equation provides GDP for all the départements. Of 
course, this calculation is an evaluation. Hence, some exogenous shocks on 
production could be erased by the estimation.  
Given that no information is available on agricultural production per 
area for 1881, we estimate the data using the 1891 values. The calculation 
assumes a smooth spread of agricultural value-added from 1881 to 1891. 
This hypothesis is not heroic since factors of evolution are rather exogenous 
in the short run. The phylloxera that reached their peak during the period 
could, however, be a bias. Determination of GDP for 1881 is thus: 
 
(3)                               1881 , 1881 1881 1891 , 1891 , 1881 , i
i





































































Table 7: Determinants of the growth in local bank branch density from 
1881 to 1911 
The dependant variable is the variation in the number of local and regional bank branches 
from 1881 to 1911. The panel includes all cities of more than 100,000 inhabitants plus 
cities with a “prefecture” or a “sub-prefecture”. [1] includes all cities covered by the data, 
[2] includes cities with less than 100,000 inhabitants in 1910 and [3] includes cities with 
less than 75,000 inhabitants in 1910. Population in thousands of inhabitants. 
Independent 
variables [1]  [2]  [3] 
Variation in deposit bank branches per 
inhabitant  -0.46**    -0.47**  -0.48** 
   (0.22)  (-0.23)  (-0.23) 
Population variation  -0.21  -0.20  -0.16 
   (0.33)  (0.13)  (0.17) 
Variation in Banque branches  -0.16  -0.11  -0.09 
   (0.28)  (0.27)  (0.27) 
Constant -0.01  -0.01  -0.01 
   (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
R² 0.10  0.10  0.10 
N  389 375 365 
     
***, ** and * significant at 1%, 5% and 10% 
Interpretation: an one-point increase in the density of deposit bank branches reduces local 


























































1Table 8: Determinants of Banque profits by département 
The dependant variable is the Banque’s profit for 1881, 1891, 1901 and 1911. Deposit 
bank market share is the number of deposit bank branches divided by the total 
number of branches in a département. Profits in thousands of francs; population in 
thousands of inhabitants; firms per hundred. 
Independent 
variables  [1]   [2] 
  
deposit bank market share    -0.21*   -0.46*** 
   (0.12)  (0.13) 
      
average firm size   0.56*  0.10 
   (0.28)  (0.19) 
      
Banque loans to GDP       0.63***      0.69*** 
   (0.10)  (0.12) 
      
number of Banque branches   0.06**  0.08** 
   (0.03)  (0.03) 
      
firms per capita  0.32  0.50** 
   (0.57)  (0.21) 
      
bank branches per capita  0.53  1.18** 
   (0.62)  (0.51) 
      
per capita GDP  0.66  0.93*** 
   (0.46)  (0.30) 
      
population density  0.87  1.11 
   (1.72)  (0.87) 
      
constant   -1.16*   -0.37*** 
   (0.66)  (.11) 
      
individual effects  fixe  random 
Hausman test  p =0.0013  
      
R² 0.64  0.73 
N 336  336 
***, ** and * significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, standard errors in brackets 
Interpretation: a 1% increase in deposit bank market share reduces the Banque’s 
















































1Table 9: Determinants of credit development with IV-GMM 
The dependant variable is credit/GDP in [1] and [2] and credit/firms in [3] and [4]. GMM-
IV regressions with time and geographic fixed effects. The IV is the dummy for 1911 
multiplied by the dummy “prefecture”, equal to one if the prefecture is not the biggest city 
in the département in 1881 and zero otherwise. 
          
 [1]  [2]  [3]  [4] 
          
Banque branch density  0.41*    0.59   
 (0.23)    (0.38)   
        
Banque branches    0.61*    0.85 
   (0.34)    (0.54) 
        
population density   -0.71**   -0.65**   -1.00**   -0.90** 
 (0.30)  (0.25)  (0.49)  (0.41) 
        
firms per capita   -0.21   -0.11     
 (0.31)  (0.29)     
        
average firm size   -0.13   -0.11 0.42**  0.45** 
 (0.17)  (0.16)  (0.19)  (0.17) 
        
bank branches per capita  0.15***  0.15***  0.12*  0.12* 
 (0.44)  (0.44)  (0.07)  (0.07) 
        
Constant 0.28***  0.27***  0.34***  0.32*** 
 (0.08)  (0.07)  (0.11)  (0.10) 
        
Observations 248  248  248  248 
EI-test 0.001  0.001  0.004  0.001 
WH-test 0.26  0.38  0.34  0.45 
        


























































1Table 10: determinants of credit development with IV-
GMM 
The dependant variable is the difference in credit/GDP in [1] and [2] and credit/firms in [3] 
and [4] from 1881 to 1911. GMM-IV regressions. The IV is the difference in the population 
share of the first and second city in 1881. Results of the other control variables on request 
from the author. 
     Independent 
variables [1]  [2]  [3]  [4] 
          
Variation in Banque 
branch density  0.06**    0.07**   
 (0.03)    (0.03)   
          
Variation in Banque 
branches   0.09**  0.11** 
     (0.40)    (0.48) 
          
Constant  0.18*  0.15   -0.07   -0.07 
   (0.11)  (0.10)  (0.11)  (0.11) 
          
N 83  83  83  83 
EI-test 0.005  0.001  0.001  0.001 
WH-test 0.060  0.066  0.009  0.008 
        
***, ** and * significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, standard errors in brackets 
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